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Reconciling Divergent Rights : New 
York 's Proposed Police and Public Protection Act 
Christoph er J. Morse 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
fn the United States the cons t itutional rights of individu-
als are set forth in the Co nstit u tion of the United States 
and in the constitutions of the states . The United States 
Constitution is the basic law of the land and creating th e 
minimum protections afforded individuals . Each state is 
free to enact its own law as long as it does not diminish 
the rights of individuals under the federal constitution. 
The legislative bodies of the United States and each indi-
vidual state have enacted statutes that constitute the 
criminal procedure law of that jurisdiction . Thes e statu-
tory schemes are similar since the y are based upon the 
same constitutional principles . This article examines th e 
model Police and Public Protection Act of New York , de-
signed to amend and expand state criminal procedure law 
The act has bee n introduced by New York's Governor 
George Pataki. and uses New York Stat e Criminal Proce-
dure Law , although it would serve as a model for most 
states. 
I NTROD UCTIO N 
Although the search and seiz ure provisions of the United States Cons titution (U.S . Const. Amend. IV) and the New York State Constitution (N.Y. Const. Art. I, Sec. 
12) are virtua lly identi cal, the Co urt of Appeals (New York 's 
highest court) has inte rprete d the state constitution's provisions 
more broadly than its federa l counterpart. In New York, a typical 
"Terry" stop and frisk (Terry v. Ohio 1968), which the U.S. Su-
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preme Court has held meets the federal constitutional standard, is 
treated with greater scrutiny by New York's high court. The state 
court, relying on state constitutional law, has enunciated a defi-
nition of "reasonableness" (the touchstone of all search and sei-
zure analysis) that, in effect, makes some searches and seizures 
that would not violate the federal constitution unreasonable as a 
matter of state law.1 Consequently, evidence has been suppressed 
in New York state courts that would be constitutionally admissi-
ble in federal court. 
The phenomenon of divergent constitutional jurisprudence 
based on state constitutional grounds has increased in recent 
years,2 especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Michigan v. Long ( 1983) which clearly articulated the standard 
for determining whether a state court decision rested on an ade-
quate and independent ground. 
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed this 
approach: "We believe that Michigan v. Long properly serves its 
purpose and should not be disturbed. Under it, state courts are 
absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to ac-
cord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provi-
sions of the United States Constitution" (Arizona v. Evans 1995). 
Diversity of constitutional protections between the federal 
and state laws is not without problems , however. New York's 
governor, George Pataki , has bitterly complained about the Court 
of Appeals, beginning in a 1996 press conference: "In New York 
State , a body of court interpretations has arisen that handcuffs 
our police officers, that limits our prosecutors' ability to enforce 
the law adequately and makes it too often impossible to have a 
'Compare People v. De8011r (l 976) with Terry v. Ohio (I 968), discussed below. 
2The Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court has written an excellent introduction to 
this emerging trend. Randall T. Shepard. TTie New Judicial Federalism: A New Genera-
tion : The Mat11ring Na111re of State Constillltion J11rispmdence, 30 Val. U.L. Rev. 42 l 
(1996). 
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fair trial. It has got to change . "3 Pataki introduced in the New 
York State Assembly, the Police and Public Protection Act4 in an 
effort to bring the state 's standard in line with the looser federal 
standard of reasonableness. The bill would amend the state 's 
criminal procedure statutory law in a way that effectively adopts 
several standards from the U.S. Supreme Court 's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to the exclusion of standards that the 
New York Court of Appeals has held are embodied in the state 
constitution. 
Some critics contend that the governor 's proposal represents 
an all-out assault on the Fourth Amendment, and more particu-
larly, the exclusionary rule.5 The proponents of the bill , on the 
contrary, contend that the proposed bill seeks a return to feder-
ally recognized standards that guarantee the rights of the accused 
and incorporate a reasonableness standard that protects law en-
forcement officers as well as the public at large. 
This paper examines and explains the Governor 's proposal , 
concluding that it is both prudent and constitutional. The second 
and third sections of the paper examine the federal constitutional 
standard and the origins and development of the state constitu -
tion 's search and seizure provisions , respectively . The next sec-
tion introduces and discusses the proposed legislation. Finall y, 
the conclu sion offer s some thou ghts on rea sonablenes s and ef-
fective law enforcement. 
3Clifford J. Levy, " Pataki is See king Curbing of Rights of Crime Suspec ts," N. Y Times, 
Jan. JO. 1996, p. A 1 (her einafter Crime S11spec1s). 
'S . Bill 6 154. introd uced Octobe r I J. 1999, by Senato r Vo lker . The bil l was origi nally 
propose d in Gove rnor Patak i 's State of the State addr ess in 1996. See Crime Suspec ts, 
foomote J. 
5For exampl e, Norman Sieg al, Executive Director of the New York Civi l Libertie s Union, 
ca lled the proposal "ar, attempt to demonize and unde rm ine the independenc e of the 
Court of Appeals ." and suspects that Patak i is try ing "to chill (the Co urt of Appeals] for 
future inte rpretati ons ." Crime Suspects. footno te J. p. A I . 
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THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION'S 
REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
The U .S. Supreme Court predicates the reasonableness of a 
search and seizure on the Fourth Amendment. 6 In the context of 
what is "reasonable" for a protective search by law enforcement 
officers , the Court defined the constitutional dimensions of "rea-
sonableness " in Terry v. Ohio (1968) . 
In Terry, two defendants were observed behaving suspi-
ciously by a police officer : they walked up and down the block , 
looked into a store window, and returned to their original posi-
tion on the come!," to confer. The officer noted that the duo re-
peated this ritual five or six times. When a third man appeared 
and proceeded to converse with the duo, the police officer sus-
pected they were "casing a job. " The officer decided to investi-
gate ; he approached the trio to inquire about their actions. One of 
the suspects mumbled something incoherent in response to the 
officer 's inquiry , at which point the officer spun the defendant 
around and patted down the outside of his clothing. The officer 
felt a pistol in the defendant 's overcoat , but he was initially un-
able to remove it. Finally, when the defendant was asked to re-
move his overcoat , the officer retrieved a .38 caliber revolver ; a 
"pat down " of the other defendant yielded a second concealed 
weapon . 
The defense motion to suppress the evidence on the ground 
that the search violated the Fourth Amendment was rejected at 
trial and the defendant s were convicted. On appeal to the Su-
preme Court , the conviction was affirmed. The majority of the 
Court held that it would be unreasonable to deny the officer the 
power necessary to determine whether the person under suspi-
•see Elkins v. United States ( 1960): "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and 
seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." 
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cion is carrying a weapon. The Court proceeded to promulgate a 
reasonableness standard that protects law enforcement officers 
and the public at large-a standard that embodies the protections 
under the Fourth Amendment. ; 
The admissibility of the fruits of an illegal search and seizure, 
more commonly known as the exclusionary rule , was established 
in Weeks v. United (1914) ,7 where the Supreme Court held that 
any evidence retrieved by means of an illegal search and seizure 
would be inadmissible in court . The Court 's decision was in-
strumental in setting out the criteria to which federal law en-
forcement officials would adhere when effecting a search and 
seizure . Moreover , the resultant reaction to the exclusionary rule 
was the catalyst for the 1938 New York constitutional conven -
tion. Article I Sec . 12 of the state constitution enumerates the 
right against unreasonable searches and seizures , and is now the 
point of contention of judicial interpretation in modem day 
search and seizure adjudication in New York State .8 
With the expanded application of the exclusionary rule came 
maj or developments in search and seizure law. The Warren 
Court , which tightened criminal procedural requiremen ts for the 
federal and state governments, imposed more stringent Fourth 
Amendment standards and greatly curtailed exceptions to war-
rantles s searches. 9 
More recentl y, however. the exclusionary rule has itself been 
scaled back. The Burger Court declined to expand application of 
the rule and refu sed to apply it to grand jury proceedin gs, 1° un-
' The defendant was charged w ith us ing the mads to promo te illegal gambli ng, and the 
evidence include d le tters seize d from his home dun ng a wa rrant less sea rch . The Supreme 
Cou rt suppr esse d the letters . 
8Before the 1938 consti tu tional conve nt ion . New York was one of the few sta tes without 
a s tate constnu tional co unte rp an to the fede ral constiruu on 's fou rth amendment. 
9See . e .g., Warden v . Hay.fe n ( 1967 ). de lineatin g a narrow exce pt ion for ' ho t pur suit.' 
10See United States v. Calandra (197 -l). · 
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less the evidence was obtained in violation of the federal wire-
tapping statute , 11 to cases where the Fourth Amendment infrac-
tion violated the rights of persons other than the accused, 12 or to 
cases where the police had a good-faith belief that their conduct 
. . l 13 
was constitut10na . 
Not only did the Burger Court refuse to expand the scope of 
the exclusionary rule, but also the justices (several of whom had 
questioned its underlying doctrine) began to gradually carve 
away at it. In California v. Minjares (1979), Justice Rehnquist, 
joined by Chief Justice Burger, explicitly called for the "whole-
sale reexamination" of the rule, and strongly suggested that its 
contemporary underpinnings were theoretically weak. Justice 
White, dissenting in Stone v. Powell ( 1976), explicitly endorsed 
modifying the exclusionary rule "so as to prevent its application 
in those may circumstances where the evidence at issue was 
seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his con-
duct comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds 
for this belief." Justice Powell, in Schneckloth v. Bustamante 
(1973) advised against extending the rule to federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings. In Brewer v. Williams (1977), Justice Powell 
went even further when he suggested that the rule should not be 
triggered by technical or inadvertent Fourth Amendment viola-
tions. Chief Justice Burger, concurring with the dissent in Stone, 
explicitly called for modifying the scope of the exclusionary 
rule. Finally , Justice Blackrnun, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire 
(1971 ), advanced the view that the exclusionary rule was not a 
Fourth Amendment edict. 
''See Unired Srnres v. Ge11hnrd ( 1972). 
12See Rnkos v . Illinois (1978). In order for a defendant to claim Fou11h Amendment pro-
tection, he must show that ht: has standing by demonstrating that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the place or item seized. 
13St;e U11ired Stntes v. Leo11 ( 1984 ). 
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With the Justices questioning the soundness of the exclusion-
ary rule, it was inevitable that an exception to it would be estab-
lished. A good-faith exception to the rule was announced in 
United States v. Leon (1984) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard 
( 1984). In those cases, the Court held that the exclusionary rule 
could not be used to bar evidence gathered by officers acting in 
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral mag-
istrate. The Court reasoned that because the primary purpose of 
the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of police misconduct, it 
need not apply to judicial officers issuing warrants. As the Court 
explained in Leon, "the Fourth Amendment contains no provi-
sion expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of its commands, and an examination of its origin and pur-
pose makes clear that the use of fruits of past unlawful search 
and seizure works no new 'Fourth Amendment wrong."' The 
Court went further by describing the exclusionary rule as a "ju-
dicially created remecy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." The good-
faith exception was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Arizona 
v. Evans O 995), where an officer made an arrest pursuant that 
was erroneously entered by a court clerk on the police computer. 
''[B]ecause court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement 
team engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime ... they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal 
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be 
expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform police 
officials that a warrant had been quashed." Furthermore "[I]f 
court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer 
record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently 
deter future errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction [as the 
exclusion of said evidence)." The court held that the suppression 
VOL. 29 200 l 
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of evidence because of clerical error on the part of those with no 
interest in the outcome of a police investigation undermines law 
enforcement. 
At the same time that New York criminal procedure laws 
were more restrictive, the Supreme Court continued to expand 
the authority of the federal agents in order to ensure the public 
safety of society. This expansion included the automatic right of 
police officers with probable cause to inspect belongings found 
in a car that is capable of concealing the object of the search. 14 
Moreover, in Minnesota v. Carter (19xx), the Court revisited the 
issue of standing and held that a guest in the home of another 
could not object to the warrantless search of the home. 15 The 
most interesting facet of this case is the method in which the law 
enforcement officers had obtained information about the defen-
dants illegal drug trafficking: The officers were looking in an 
apartment window through the gaps in a closed Venetian blind. 
The Court chose to decide this case on standing, but it not clear 
how the Court would have decided if defendant otherwise did 
have standing. 16 Based upon the court's earlier ruling in Katz v. 
United States ( 1967), the court would probably have upheld the 
search on the ground that anyone walking by could have ob-
served the activities through the gaps in the blinds. Moreover, 
because of the commercial nature of the activity involved, the 
expectation of privacy was "different from, and less than, a 
similar expectation in a home" (New York v. Burger 1987). 
14See Wyoming v. Ho11gluo11 ( 1999). 
15The defendant was bagging cocaine in his confederate's apartment and evidence indi-
cated that the apartment was be,ng used for business purposes as opposed to a "home ." 
As a general proposition of standing. the Court determined that legitimate overnight 
guests in another ' s premises do have standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy . 
16Justice Rehnquist speaking for the majority had observed "because we conclude that 
respondenlS had no legitimate expectauon of privacy in the apartment. we need not de-
cide whether the police oflicer's observauons consututed a 'search.'" 
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NEW YORK STATE'S L AW 
Origin of the State 's Search and Seizure Prohibition 
In New York State, Judge Cardozo of the Court of Appeal s 
was high ly critic al of the Supreme Court's ruling in Weeks and 
the exc lusion rule it recognized: 
We must determine whether evidence of criminality, 
procured by an act of trespass, is to be rejected as in-
competent for the misconduct of the trespasser. [T]he 
criminal is to go free because the constable blun -
dered .... [I]n this State the immunity is the creature, 
not of the constitution, but of statute . . . .. The Legis-
lature, which created it, has acquiesced in the ruling 
of this court that prohibitio n of the search did not 
anathe matize the evidence yielded through the 
search. If we had misread the statute or misconceived 
the public policy, a few words of amendment would 
have quickly set us right. The process of amendment 
is prompt and simple . [A] room is searched against 
the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If 
the place of discovery may not be proved, the other 
circumstances may be insufficient to connect the de-
fendant with the crime . The privacy of the home has 
been infringed and the murderer goes free. [W]e may 
not subject society to these dangers until the Legis-
lature has spoken with a clea rer voice. [T]he question 
is whether protection for the individual would not be 
gained at a disproportional loss of protection for so-
ciety . One the one side is the social need that crime 
shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that 
laws not be flouted by the insolence of office. There 
are dar.gers in any choice . The rule of the Adams case 
strikes a balance between opposing interests. We 
must hold it to be law until those organs of govern-
ments by which a change of public polic y is normally 
effected. shall give notice to the courts that the 
change has come to pass (Peopl e v. DeFor e 1926). 
VOL. 29 20 0 l 
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In People v. DeFore (1926) , the arresting officer entered the 
defendant 's room and searched it after the defendant was in cus-
tody. The search yielded a bag containing a blackjack. Although 
the defendant was acquitted of larceny (the basis for the arrest in 
the first instance), he was subsequently indicted and convicted of 
illegal weapons possession based on the blackjack discovered in 
the post-arrest warrantless search. On appeal, the conviction was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In a scathing opinion, Judge 
Cardozo declared that it would be a mistake to allow "the crimi-
nal [to go] free because the constable has blundered" and public 
welfare and safety concerns must override the illegality of the 
search. In essence, Cardozo stated that the evidence would not be 
suppressed unless the state legislature overrides the Court of Ap-
peal 's decision by constitutional amendment. In sum , he sug-
gested that the lawmakers "fix" the problem by amending the 
New York State Constitution. 
Cardozo's call for a state constitution convention, however, 
did not anticipate that the federal constitutional search and sei-
zure prohibitions would become binding on the states in Wolf v. 
Colorado (1949). ii The issues addressed by the Court of Appeals 
in DeFore were pivotal in the arguments made by Thomas 
Dewey and others at the New York constitutional convention. 
The debate in New York over search and seizure provisions 
began at the 1938 convention. Thomas E. Dewey, a Republican 
and a one-time federal and special state prosecutor was elected 
as District Attorney of New York County (Pitier 1996). Dewey 
was also a staunch opponent of an exclusionary rule and pro-
posed judicial supervision of wiretapping. 
The primary proponent of the new constitutional provisions 
was State Senator and Democratic majority leader John Dunni-
gan. Dunnigan 's liberal proposal was three-tiered: first, it would 
replicate the language of the Fourth Amendment; second , it 
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brought the interception of telephone, telegraph, and other com-
munications within the scope of New York's Constitution; third, 
it required the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of 
these prohibitions. 
In the end, the convention was able to agree on a compromise 
that became Article I Sec. 12 of the New York constitution. The 
language is identical to the federal constitution's search and sei-
zure provision (U.S. Const. Amend. IV), with the addition of an 
extra paragraph addressing wiretapping. The exclusionary rule 
itself was not explicitly inserted into the text. 
New York State's Standard 
Because of the provisions of the New York State Constitu-
tion, the Court of Appeals expanded its interpretation of what a 
"protective search" and "reasonableness" entail. New York law 
departs from the Terry doctrine, and has its own guidelines for 
reasonableness in prot~ctive searches, first articulated in People 
v. DeBour (1976). 
In DeBow; two police officers were on patrol around mid-
night on a street illuminated by ordinary street lamps, devoid of 
pedestrian traffic. They noticed a solitary figure (the defendant 
DeBour) across the street. When the officers stopped to inquire 
what he was doing in the neighborhood, the defendant nervously 
responded that he had "just parked his car and was on his way to 
visit a friend.'' When asked for identification. he said that he did 
not have any. Meanwhile. one of the officers noticed a slight 
waist-high bulge in his jacket. The officer asked the defendant to 
unzip his jacket; in so doing, the defendant revealed a revolver 
protruding from his waistband. The gun was removed, and De-
Bour was arrested for illegal possession of a weapon. The offi-
cer's testimony conflicted with the defendant's, and the trial 
court denied the defense motion to suppress, crediting the offi-
VOL. 29 2001 
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cer's testimony. The a~~ellate division affirmed conviction 
(People v. DeBour 1975). 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, DeBour was heard along 
with a similarly situated case, People v. La Pene (1976). The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in DeBour, but re-
versed the conviction in La Pene. The opinion of the court set 
the stage for the interpretation of the New York State Constitu-
tion and marked the beginning of a new standard for protective 
searches (Pitier 1996). 
Judge Wachtler proceeded to enunciate a "reasonableness" 
standard-a four-tier system called the "sliding scale" approach 
(People v. DeBour 1975). On the first level, the minimal intru-
sion of an officer in approaching a citizen to request information 
is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for 
that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality . The 
next level, the common law right to inquire, requires that the in-
quiry must be activated by "a founded suspicion predicated on 
articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot."iii Wachtler 
maintained that an officer may interfere with a citizen only to 
gain explanatory information, with the encounter being short of a 
forcible seizure. The third degree of intrusion is the police offi-
cer's right to stop by force and detain an individual when the 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual has com-
mitted, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or misde-
meanor. In New York, this level is authorized by statute (McKin-
ney 2000). 18 The fourth and final level of intrusion is when a 
police officer arrests and takes into custody a person when there 
is probable cause to believe that person committed a crime in the 
officer's presence. These four levels represent " ... the gradation 
11People v. De8011r, 37-1 N.Y. S.2d .. NI (NY. App . Div . 2nd Dep't. I 975) . 
18This, of course. 1s the key sw1ute that the Governor's proposal would sigmficantly 
modify . 
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of permissible police authority with respect to encounters with 
citizens in public places and directly correlates the degree of ob-
jectively credible belief with the permissible scope of inference." 
New York's "sliding scale" approach, unlike its federal 
counterpart which uses a three-tier system (Terry v. Ohio 1968), 
sets a much more difficult standard for police officers. The 
common law inquiry does not mandate that officers justify their 
actions on the belief that "criminal activity is afoot." Rather, of-
ficers are left to their own discretion to determine if further ac-
tion is necessary on the contingency that they do not go beyond 
constitutional limitations. The court 's decision shifted the deter-
mination of constitutional limitations to the judgment of the po-
lice officer. 
The Court of Appeals has never overruled the standard set 
forth in DeBour. While many legal scholars consider the court's 
standard as too burdensome, the court , itself, has said that the 
standards enunciated ir, DeBour remain. In People v. Finlayson 
( 1980), the court asserted that the standards enunciated in De-
Bour remain effective and necessary guidelines in determining 
the reasonableness of police actions when no warrant exists. iv 
Most recently , New York courts have sought to retain the ba-
sic standards of reasonableness in its constitutional dimensions, 
and yet criticize DeBour for its rigidity. In People v. Hanson 
( 1998), the defense moved to suppress on the ground that the 
Terry stop violated the New York State Constitution. The motion 
to suppress was denied. In an interesting interpretation of the 
DeBvur standard, the court allowed that DeBour should not be 
disturbed ; however. the court added that police conduct which is 
"reasonable'' is not to be confined by "an inflexible legal frame-
work" and found that DeBour is flexible enough to make deter-
minations based on the merits of each individual case .v 
VOL . 29 200 l 
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THE POLICE AND P UBLIC PROTECTION ACT 
The Governor's proposal seeks to eliminate the "second-
guessing" that a police officer is faced with each time he seeks to 
question a citizen. Almost all other states, with the exception of 
New York, follow the traditional common law rules for encoun-
ters between police and the public as endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Terry. 
The proposed legislation is actually quite short: approxi-
mately a page and a half typewritten. In essence, it adds the fol-
lowing two substantive additio_ns to the state's criminal proce-
dure law. 
First, it states that "when engaged in law enforcement duties, 
a police officer may approach a person in a public place located 
within the geographical area of such officer's employment when 
he has an objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of 
criminality, and to the full extent possible under the Constitution 
of this state and the United States may ask such questions and 
take such other actions as the officer deems appropriate." 
Second, and perhaps more substantively, the bills adds the 
following: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
court may not suppress evidence ... on account of a violation of 
any right secured accorded by [the state constitution] unless the 
court finds after a hearing that the conduct constituting the vio-
lation was committed in bad faith and not in whole or in part for 
the purpose of protecting the actor or another person .... " Clearly, 
the proposal effects a sea change in the Court of Appeals' juris-
prudence in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
It is reasonable to conclude that with the Supreme Court's 
unequivocal adoption of a standard that leaves state courts to 
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their own devices, state judicial review in search and seizure 
cases will continue to be premised on antiquated , less-than-
objective standards unless adequate legislation to the contrary is 
enacted. The governor's proposal would remedy out-dated and 
inconsistent common law requirements for law enforcement offi-
cials to follow. It is possible to protect the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the accused while simultaneously protecting the public 
and the police officers who enforce New York's laws. Police er-
ror is not tantamount to violating an accused rights because the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, and not all searches and seizures are unreasonable. 19 New 
York may use its legislative powers, as enunciated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, to restrict within limits allowed by the U.S . 
Constitution, search and seizure requirements in the state: the 
criminal may not go free because the constable has blundered . 
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ENDNOTES 
i"[l]n order to assess the reasonableness [of an officer's] conduct as a general proposi-
tion, it is necessary to first focus upon the constitutionally protected interests of the pri-
vate citizen, for there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by bal-
ancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] 
entails." 392 U.S. at 20-21, citing Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) [internal quotation 
marks omitted]. "The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when 
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can 
be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances . 
And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objec-
tive standard : would the facts available to the officer warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? . . . (T]he sole justification for the 
search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby and 
therefore, must be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover 
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer etc .... 
the search in this case presents no serious problems in light of these standards." [internal 
quotation marks omitted] . 
ii . . In Wolf, the Court concluded that the treedom from unreasonable search and seizure 
was an essential element in the concept of "ordered liberry," which was applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing for the 
Court, argued that "one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police was a funda-
mental Fourth Amendment guarantee." While the decision in Wolf prohibited States from 
engaging in unreasonable search and seizures, it did not require application of the exclu-
sionary rule in state prosecutions-this prohibition would be enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio 
(.1_961). 
111Judge Wachtler speaking for the majority of the court stated: ''Generally, m the p.:r-
formance of their public service functions, not related to criminal law enforcement, the 
police should be given wide latitude to approach individuals and request information .... 
However, when police officers are engaged in their criminal law enforcement function 
their ability to approach people involves other considerations and will be viewed and 
measured by an entirely different standard of reasonableness .... Unfortunately, there is 
scant appellate authority on this subject. even the maJority of the Supreme Court m the 
Terry trilogy (Ten)' v. Ohio 1968) ~xplicitly avoided resolving the constitutional propri-
ety of an investigative confrontation . 
iv The court said "The Court of Appeals in DeBour identified four levels of police intru-
sion and the degree of knowledge and credible belief needed to Justify each. lt has now 
been suggested that recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court have affected, and 
perhaps undermined, some of the classifications enunciated in DeBour. Yet even if this 
point of view were com.•:1-a proposition which is hardly free from doubt-the essenual 
value of the DeBour holding would survive. DeBour uid not attempt to establish an in-
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flexible legal framework by which to measure police conduct. Encounters between citi-
zens and the police in public places are of an endless variety with no two being precisely 
alike . .. Any attempt to catalogue them rigidly within four classifications would not only 
prove virtually impossible but might well present a true danger of substituting labels for 
liberties. DeBour makes no such attempt. Rather, its careful analysis provides needed and 
effective guidelines for determining the reasonableness, and therefore the constitutional-
ity, of police action in given circumstances" [internal citations and quotations omitted] . 
;.,.Any legal scholar, and probably more than a few English teachers , could mount a 
sizeable argument that both counsels ' amoebic arguments , of counsel themselves, not 
uncommon in the criminal courts of this State under similar circumstances, are them-
selves toxic byproducts of DeBour and its progeny . ... There are no bright lines separating 
various types of police activity . Determining whether a seizure occurs during a street 
encounter between the police and a private citizen involves analysis of the most subtle 
aspects of our constitutional guarantees" (citing People v . Bora 1994) [internal quotations 
and citations omitted] . 
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